We study debt and default policy for sovereign countries when credit and liquidity risk are jointly determined. To account for both types of risks we focus on an economy with incomplete markets, limited commitment, and search frictions in the secondary market for sovereign bonds. We quantify the effect of liquidity on sovereign spreads, debt capacity, and welfare by performing quantitative exercises when our model is calibrated to match key features of the Argentinean default. We find that the liquidity premium is a substantial component of spreads and increases during bad times and reductions in secondary market frictions improve welfare. * We would like to thank
Introduction
Sovereign countries borrow to smooth shocks to income and tax revenue. One friction that prevents the smoothing of expenses over time and states of nature is governments' inability to commit to future debt and default policies. This lack of commitment implies that the government will repay its debts only if it is convenient to do so and will dilute debt holders whenever it sees fit. To compensate investors for bearing these risks the sovereign pays a credit risk premium that reduces the available resources for domestic consumption and can substantially increase borrowing costs during bad times. The sovereign debt literature has helped us to understand how a lack of commitment shapes the outcomes of sovereign countries from a positive point of view and what policies are desirable from a normative point of view. 1 The recent European debt crisis, however, has underscored that decentralized markets impose additional frictions that prevent smoothing by sovereign countries. Their bonds are traded mostly in over-the-counter markets, where trading is infrequent; thus, if an investor holds a large position in a sovereign bond, it might take time to find a counterparty willing to trade at a fair price. For this reason, investors need to be compensated not only for the risk of default or dilution but also due to illiquidity, which introduces, in addition, a liquidity risk premium. This liquidity premium further reduces available resources and constrains sovereign policies. So far, the literature has been silent about this feature of sovereign borrowing. Our objective in this paper is to fill this gap by answering the following questions: How do credit and liquidity premium interact? What portions of total spreads can be explained by credit and by liquidity? What would be the welfare gains of reducing frictions in the secondary market?
Our paper contributes to the literature on sovereign borrowing in two ways. First, we propose a tractable model of sovereign borrowing in which credit and liquidity premia jointly determine borrowing and default decisions. Second, in a quantitative exploration focusing on one of the most studied cases of sovereign default, Argentina's default in 2001, we show that the liquidity premium is a substantial component of total spreads. In particular, through the lens of our model, the welfare gains from the elimination of liquidity frictions are, quantitatively, of the same order of magnitude as the gains from eliminating business cycle fluctuations.
We begin our paper by constructing a model of sovereign debt where debt and default policy take into account credit and liquidity risk. We focus on a small open economy that borrows from international investors to smooth income shocks following the quantitative literature on sovereign debt that builds on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) . A benevolent government designs debt and default policies to maximize the utility of the households by issuing non-contingent debt. The government cannot commit to future debt and default policies and might default in some states of nature. The distinctive feature of our model, in comparison to the previous literature, is the introduction of frictions in the secondary market for sovereign bonds, following the literature on over-the-counter markets, such as Duffie et al. (2005) . In our model, investors buy bonds in the primary market and can receive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. If a shock occurs, they will bear a cost for holding the asset and therefore become natural sellers of it. Due to search frictions in the secondary market, it will take time for them to find a counterparty with whom to transact.
One of the main features of the model we propose is that default and liquidity risk will be jointly determined. On the one hand, the presence of search frictions in the secondary market introduces a liquidity premium that affects prices in the primary market, thereby affecting debt and default policies, which in turn affect the credit risk premium. On the other hand, as the credit risk premium increases, the probability of default also increases, and because investors foresee worse liquidity conditions in the future, liquidity conditions will also deteriorate. Therefore, in our model, the default and liquidity risk premia are jointly determined. This joint determination is important because it will enable us to decompose total spreads into liquidity and credit components and to study the effects on welfare of reducing liquidity frictions in the secondary market.
After building a model of sovereign borrowing in which both credit and liquidity premia constrain the choices of the government, we perform quantitative exercises to assess how much of total spreads are due liquidity frictions and what would be the welfare gains of eliminating these frictions. To do so, we calibrate the model to match key features of Argentina's default in 2001. In particular, we match debt levels, the mean and volatility of spreads, bid-ask spreads, and turnover, to counterparts in the data.
Our first quantitative finding is that the liquidity premium is a substantial component of total spreads. In particular, we find that during good times, characterized by low debt and high output, approximately 30 percent of total spreads can be explained by liquidity frictions in the case of Argentina's 2001 default. During bad times, characterized by high debt and low output, when the credit risk premium is high, the percentage of total spreads is lower. The intuition for these results is as follows. Bid-ask spreads measure an investor's loss conditional on receiving a liquidity shock. Thus, the compensation paid to investors due to liquidity risk will be a function of bid-ask spreads. During good times, investors demand a low credit risk premium, because the event of default is unlikely, but the liquidity risk is bounded away from zero. During bad times, as the probability of default increases, investors demand a higher credit risk premium. This higher probability of default will also increase the liquidity risk premium because the liquidity of defaulted bonds is lower. However, the credit risk premium will increase faster than the liquidity risk premium, which is why during bad times the liquidity premium will decrease as a fraction of total spreads.
Our second quantitative finding is that the welfare gains from eliminating liquidity risk are substantial. To explore the size of these welfare gains, we perform an exercise following Lucas (2003) . We find that the welfare loss induced by secondary market frictions is 0.17 percent in consumption equivalent terms. To put this number in perspective, given the volatility of consumption for Argentina in the period of study, a representative agent would pay 0.40 percent in consumption equivalent terms to eliminate fluctuations.
We believe that the distinction between credit and liquidity risk is important for the design of debt policies for three reasons. First, in the long run, the policies to mitigate lack of commitment differ from those to mitigate frictions in the secondary market. For example, Hatchondo and Martinez (2015) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) show that fiscal rules and covenants on debt improve welfare in models when the government lacks commitment. However, policies that would decrease the liquidity premium in the long run include the development of a centralized exchange for sovereign bond trading or increasing transparency in the secondary market, as reported in Edwards et al. (2004) . Second, the policies implemented during a short-term crisis might also be different. For example, a government could use resources to repay debt or to bail-out financial institutions that hold government debt and are in distress. An alternative policy, focusing on the secondary market, would be to provide liquidity to intermediaries. Finally, we believe that that the liquidity premium has implications for debt management. By issuing debt in different currencies or with different maturities, the government caters to investors and completes the market. However, this increase in the number of assets might imply low liquidity for each one of these bonds, which in turn increases the cost of debt for the government.
Our paper connects with different strands of the literature. First, to the quantitative literature of sovereign default that follows Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) . In particular, our model builds on the setting developed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) to study business cycles in economies with a risk of default. These early quantitative implementations study economies with short-term debt and no recovery on default. Long-term debt was introduced by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) . In a model of long-term debt Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) introduces randomization to obtain continuous policy functions. Aided with this randomization the authors prove the existence of a fixed point in the pricing operator. Endogenous recovery of defaulted debt was introduced by Yue (2010). 2 In our paper the sovereign borrows by issuing long-term bonds and after a default investors recover a fraction of their investment. The first ingredient is crucial to obtain positive liquidity premia and the second is necessary to guarantee that bonds have a positive value during default. We model long-term debt following Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) . To keep the model numerically tractable we introduce a reduced form recovery after default and we abstract from the bargaining process; it is worth noting that our reduced form recovery after default resembles the endogenous bargaining outcome in a setup as in Yue (2010) . The main difference between the present paper and the previous literature is that we introduce liquidity frictions in the market for sovereign bonds to study the positive and normative implications of liquidity risk.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on over-the-counter markets. To model secondary market frictions we build on the setting of over-the-counter markets first studied by Duffie et al. (2005) . In that paper, investors hold one unit of an asset and can receive non-diversifiable liquidity shocks. Once they receive a shock, they search for a counterparty, and meet them randomly. This framework was extended by Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) to allow for arbitrary asset holdings for investors. 3 Our paper structures the debt market as in Duffie et al. (2005) but to keep the model numerically tractable we follow He and Milbradt (2013) and we do not keep track of the asset holdings of high-and lowvaluation investors.
Third, our paper is closely related to models of corporate borrowing. In particular, we 2 Recent contributions to the quantitative literature of sovereign debt are Bianchi et al. (2017) , Bocola and Dovis (2016) , Dovis et al. (2017) , Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) , Hatchondo et al. (2016) , Roch and Uhlig (2018) , Pouzo and Presno (2016) , Arellano and Bai (2014) , Arellano and Bai (2017) , Ottonello and Perez (2018) , Aguiar et al. (2017) , Sanchez et al. (2018) . See Aguiar and Amador (2013) for a review.
3 There has been an extensive literature that studies search in asset markets following the seminal contribution of Duffie et al. (2005) . Some recent examples are Lagos et al. (2011) that studies crises in overthe-counter markets; Afonso and Lagos (2012) that studies high frequency trading in the market for federal funds; Atkenson et al. (2013) , that studies the decisions of financial intermediaries to enter and exit an over-the-counter market. A recent literature studies the consequences of search frictions in asset markets for macroeconomic outcomes, such as output, employment and asset prices. For example, Cui and Radde (2016) studies an economy with financial frictions in which private debt is illiquid and traded by intermediaries in an over-the-counter market. Kozlowski (2017) develops a joint theory of corporate investment and maturity choice. Both decisions are affected by the liquidity premia of corporate bonds issued to finance the investment and these premia are generated by frictions in the secondary market. Gutkowski (2017) studies, through the lens of a New Keynesian Model, how an exogenous inability to sell sovereign bonds used as collateral impacts output and employment. On the empirical side, using a VAR identification, Gazzani and Vicondoa (2016) finds that shocks to liquidity, proxied by shocks to bid-ask spreads, affect macroeconomic outcomes, for example unemployment, and indicators of confidence.
build on the framework of He and Milbradt (2013) , which extends the models of corporate default as in Leland and Toft (1996) by introducing an over-the-counter market as in Duffie et al. (2005) . That paper uncovers a joint determination of liquidity and credit risk. Building on this framework Chen et al. (Forthcoming) decompose spreads into a liquidity and a credit component over the business cycle. Our paper differs from He and Milbradt (2013) and Chen et al. (Forthcoming) in two dimensions. First, there is a crucial qualitative difference between the sovereign and corporate settings. The value of default in our model is endogenously determined, whereas in He and Milbradt (2013) and Chen et al. (Forthcoming) , this value is fixed, does not depend on future liquidity conditions, and is zero in equilibrium. Second, in our setup the total debt of the sovereign country is changing over the cycle. In both He and Milbradt (2013) and Chen et al. (Forthcoming) , the capital structure is fixed. In our paper, the fact that total debt varies over the cycle implies that the response of debt and default policies to liquidity frictions is to decrease debt levels and to default in more states of nature. The former case cannot occur with a fixed capital structure.
Finally, our paper relates to a growing empirical literature that documents that liquidity is an important factor in explaining sovereign spreads. 4 Pelizzon et al. (2013) study market micro-structure using tick-by-tick data and document the strong non-linear relationship between changes in Italian sovereign risk and liquidity in the secondary bond market. Bai et al. (2012) finds that liquidity risk explains most of the spread variations before the European sovereign debt crisis and credit risk explains most of these variations at the onset of the crisis. Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) find evidence of trading frictions in the pricing of overnight loans in the federal funds market. Fleming (2002) finds evidence of liquidity effects in treasury markets. Using data on Italian bonds Pelizzon et al. (2016) finds that, in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, credit risk drives liquidity premia. Our paper builds on these empirical findings, which document sizable liquidity frictions in the market for sovereign bonds, and complements these empirical studies by quantifying the size of the liquidity premium over the business cycle and assessing the welfare losses due to liquidity frictions. 4 The evidence showing that liquidity is a factor explaining the spread of corporate bonds is more established. Longstaff et al. (2005) use data on credit default swaps to measure the size of the default and non-default components of credit spreads. They find that most of the spread is due to default risk and that the nondefault component is explained mostly by measures of bond illiquidity. Bao et al. (2011) show that there is a tight link between illiquidity and bond prices. Edwards et al. (2007) study transaction costs in over-the-counter markets and find that transaction costs decrease significantly with transparency, trade size, and bond rating, and increase with maturity. Friewald et al. (2012) find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14 percent of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. Chen et al. (2007) also find that liquidity is priced into corporate debt for a wide range of liquidity measures after controlling for common bond-specific, firm-specific, and macroeconomic variables.
Model
In this section, we present a model of sovereign default with trading frictions in the secondary market for sovereign bonds. We first describe the setting: section 2.1 describes the macroeconomic environment, section 2.2 describes the secondary bond market, and 2.3 describes the the timing of the model. We then proceed to characterize the equilibrium: section 2.4 characterizes the decisions of the government given prices, sections 2.5 and 2.6 define bond prices and valuations, and section 2.7 defines the equilibrium . Finally, section 2.8 discusses why each of the ingredients in the model are needed to quantify the credit and liquidity component of spreads and to study the welfare implications of frictions in the secondary market.
Small Open Economy
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ....}. The small open economy receives a stochastic stream of income denoted by y t . Income follows a first-order Markov process P (y t+1 = y | y t = y). The government is benevolent and wants to maximize the utility of the household. To do this, it trades bonds in the international bond market to smooth the household's consumption. The household evaluates consumption streams, c t , according to:
with time-preference β ∈ (0, 1) and utility function u (·).
The sovereign issues long-term debt when it is not in default. As in Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , each unit of debt matures with probability m each period. Non-maturing bonds pay coupon z. This memoryless formulation of the debt maturity structure means that the face value of outstanding debt is the only relevant state variable for the obligations of the government. The government can issue bonds at a price q t in the primary bond market. In equilibrium, the price of debt depends on current income, y t , and the next period's bond position, b t+1 (our convention is that b t+1 > 0 denotes debt). The budget constraint for the economy is given by:
where mb t is the repayment of principal for maturing debt, (1 − m)zb t is the total coupon payment for non-maturing debt, and q t [b t+1 − (1 − m)b t ] represents the proceeds from newly issued debt. There is limited enforcement of debt; thus, the government can default at its convenience. There are two consequences of default. First, the government loses access to the international credit market and goes into autarky. Second, output is lower during default and is given by y t − φ(y t ). That is, there is also a direct output cost of default, φ (y t ), which is a standard assumption in the literature. The government can regain access to the international credit market, which occurs with probability θ each period. A fraction of defaulted debt is written off when the government regains access to credit markets. In particular, the new face value of outstanding debt is R (b t ) = min b, b t , where b t is the amount of defaulted debt andb is a maximum recovery value. 5 That is, the fraction of recovered debt is R (b t ) /b t = min b/b t , 1 . Note that this fraction converges to zero as the amount of defaulted debt goes to infinity.
Primary and Secondary Bond Markets
There are two bond markets: the primary market and the secondary market. The government issues debt in the primary bond market. International investors can initially purchase newly issued debt in the primary market. Subsequent trading of bonds occurs in the secondary market. As in Duffie et al. (2005) and He and Milbradt (2013) , trading in the secondary bond market is subject to search frictions.
Each international investor is assumed to be small and can hold at most a single unit of government debt. These investors are risk-neutral and can be either constrained or unconstrained. Unconstrained investors price bonds by discounting future payoffs at the rate risk-free rate, r. Unconstrained investors can become constrained if they receive a liquidity shock. Liquidity shocks are idiosyncratic in nature and have a per period probability ζ of occurrence. Constrained investors also discount payoffs at the risk free rate, but are additionally subject to per period holding costs h c > 0. As a result, unconstrained investors have a high bond valuation, q H , while constrained investors have a low bond valuation, q L (the exact expressions for q H and q L are given given in sections 2.5 and 2.6). Therefore, unconstrained investors are the natural buyers of bonds in both the primary and the secondary markets, while constrained investors are the natural sellers of bonds in secondary markets. 6 Unconstrained investors try to offload their bond positions in the secondary market. As in He and Milbradt (2013) , secondary market trading is intermediated. The per period contact probability between constrained investors and intermediaries is λ. 7 Constrained investors and intermediaries bargain upon making contact. The total surplus is:
where q L is the low valuation of the constrained investor, and A denotes the ask price at which the intermediary can then offload the bond. Following He and Milbradt (2013), we assume that there is a large mass of competitive unconstrained investors waiting on the sidelines who intermediaries could contact with immediate effect. This simplifying assumption means that we do not have to keep track of the dealer's inventory as intermediaries could instantaneously offload bonds to high-valuation investors. Since the large mass of high-valuation investors on the sidelines act competitively, intermediaries can offload their positions at high valuations, and thus:
The total surplus, S = q H − q L , is then divided according to a Nash bargaining rule with the bargaining power of the constrained low valuation investors being α ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that the price at which constrained investors sell to intermediaries upon contact is:
The dollar bid-ask spread, per unit of principal, is the difference between intermediaries' selling price, q H , and buying price, q S ,
6 We interpret liquidity events as investor-specific events that prompt an immediate need to sell (e.g. to meet an expenditure). Holding costs represent the utility loss associated with delayed transactions. Valuations of debt are non-negative due to free disposal of the asset. When solving the model numerically, we additionally assume that bonds can be freely disposed. This is necessary so that the presence of holding costs do not imply negative bond prices for some off-the-equilibrium path values of the state space. Note that bond prices are always positive along the equilibrium path.
7 In equilibrium, there is no need for unconstrained investors to contact intermediaries: unconstrained investors already have high valuations, and thus, there are no gains from trade.
The proportional bid-ask spread:
is simply the dollar bid-ask spread normalized by the mid price 1 2 q H + q S . We let that the bargaining power of constrained low-valuation investors depend on whether or not the government is in default, with α D (α ND ) denoting investors' bargaining power when trading bonds that are (not) in default. We assume:
and thus that investors' have lower bargaining power when trading sovereign bonds that are in default. This implies that (dollar) bid-ask spreads are higher during default episodes. As we discuss in subsection 2.8, there is substantial evidence that bid-ask spreads are higher during default for US corporate Bonds (see, e.g., Edwards et al. (2007) and He and Milbradt (2013) ). 8
Timing
The timing for the government is as follows. First, consider the case in which the government has credit access (i.e., is not in default) and begins period t with an amount b t of outstanding debt. Income, y t , is then realized. The government then decides whether or not to default d t ∈ {0, 1}. If the government chooses not to default (d t = 0), principal payments for maturing debt, mb t , and coupon payments for non-maturing debt, (1 − m) zb t , are made. The government can then issue new debt in the primary market. An issuance with face value b t+1 − (1 − m)b t leads to outstanding debt with face value b t+1 at the start of the next period. As previously mentioned, unconstrained investors are the natural buyers of new bond issues, and thus, bonds are always issued at the high valuation, q H t . Finally, consumption takes place and is given by c t =
Next, consider the case in which the government is already in default or chooses to default in the current period (d t = 1). In this case, b t is the amount of debt that is in default. The government is in autarky and does not take any actions. Consumption is simply equal to income adjusted for the costs of default: c t = y t − φ (y t ). Nature determines whether the government regains credit access between the end of period t and the start of the next period, t + 1. The probability of regaining credit access is θ, and in that event, the government re-accesses the debt market with an outstanding debt of R(b t ) = min b, b t+1 at the start of the next period. Otherwise, the government remains in autarky.
The timing for investors is as follows. Investors are assessed holding costs, h c , for the period if they begin period t constrained. Secondary market trading for outstanding bonds occurs once per period, immediately before the government issues new bonds in the primary market. As mentioned in section 2.2, only constrained bond holders attempt to sell in the secondary market. With probability λ, a constrained investor meets an intermediary and offloads his bond position. The transaction price is q S ND (y t , b t+1 ) when the government is not in default, and q S D (y t , b t ) when the government is in default. Constrained investors who fail to contact intermediaries remain constrained going into the next period t + 1.
An investor who is unconstrained at the beginning of period t is not subject to holding costs for the period. However, such an investor can become constrained for the start of the next period t + 1 if he receives a liquidity shock during period t. Liquidity shocks occur with probability ζ and take place after the conclusion of trading in the secondary market. This means that a newly constrained investor in period t is unable to immediately offload his position in the same period. In addition, liquidity shocks occur prior to new bond issuances in the primary market. This implies that the unconstrained investors who purchased newly issued bonds during period t will still be unconstrained at the beginning of period t + 1. Figure 2 .3 summarizes the timing within each period.
The Government's Decision Problem
The government maximizes household welfare while taking bond prices as given. This infinite-horizon decision problem can be cast as a recursive dynamic programming problem. We focus on a Markov equilibrium with income, y, as the exogenous state variable and debt, b, as the endogenous state variable. The value for a government with an option to default, V ND , is the larger of the value of defaulting, V D , and the value of repayment,
The solution to this problem yields the government's default policy:
Figure 2.1: This figure summarizes the timing before and after default in period t. The government enters the period with bonds b t . Then, income, y t , is realized, and the government chooses whether or not to default, d t . Constrained investors are subject to holding costs, h c . The upper branch depicts the sequence of events in the absence of default: secondary market trading of outstanding bonds occurs, and unconstrained investors receive liquidity shocks. First, liquidity-constrained investors can sell their debt positions if they meet an intermediary. Then, the liquidity shock is realized. Then, the government issues a face value of
Finally, consumption is realized. The lower branch depicts what happens in the case in which the government defaults. First, liquidity-constrained investors can sell their debt positions if they meet an intermediary. After this, the liquidity shock is realized. Note that the primary market is closed while the government is in autarky. Then, the government will re-access the debt market in the next period with probability θ. Finally, consumption is equal to c d (y t ) = y t − φ(y t ).
That is, the government defaults whenever the value of defaulting is higher than the value of repayment.
The value of defaulting is:
where the flow utility is determined by household consumption in default, y − φ(y), while the continuation value takes into account the possibility of regaining credit market access with debt level R (b).
The value of repaying:
is subject to two constraints. The first constraint is the standard budget constraint:
where q H ND (y, b ) is the bond issuance price schedule corresponding to the high valuation of unconstrained investors during periods in which the government is not in default. In addition, as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) , the government faces an upper bound in the ex ante one-period-ahead expected default probability:
whenever there is positive debt issuance, b − (1 − m)b > 0. As explained in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) , in long-term debt models with positive recovery, the government has incentives to dilute existing bond holders by issuing large amounts of debt just prior to default. Since the liability of the government upon regaining credit access is at most b, the government will then issue an infinite amount of debt just prior to default to fully dilute existing bond holders. Constraint (2.4) rules out such counterfactual behavior. 9 The solution to the repayment problem yields the debt policy of the government:
Debt Valuations Before Default
In this section, we characterize the valuations of constrained and unconstrained investors during periods in which the government is not in default. Let y be current income, and suppose that y is the post-issuance face value of outstanding debt. The value of one unit of debt for an unconstrained investor with a high valuation is: 6) which reflects the state-contingent payoffs of the bond. An investor receives principal m and coupon (1 − m) z in the absence of default during the next period, d (y , b ) = 0. In this case, the continuation value of the 1 − m non-maturing fraction of the bond depends on next period's optimal debt policy, b = B (y , b ), and the realization of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock. A liquidity shock arrives with probability ζ, in which case the investor obtains a low continuation value, q L ND (y , b ). Otherwise, the investor remains unconstrained and assigns a high continuation value, q H ND (y , b ), to the bond. An investor does not receive any cashflow in the event of a default, d (y , b ) = 0. In this case, the government defaults on b units of debt, and the per unit price of defaulted debt is q H D (y , b ) and q L D (y , b ) for investors who do not receive and receive liquidity shocks, respectively. The value of defaulted bonds will be described, in the next section 2.6.
The price of debt for a constrained investor with a low valuation is:
The valuation of a constrained investor is similar to that of an unconstrained investor, but reflects the following differences. First, a constrained investor is assessed holding costs h c , that lower the effective value of a bond. Second, the continuation value for a constrained investor depends on trading outcomes in the secondary market. As described in section 2.2, a constrained investor sells with probability λ. The selling price (in the next period) is:
in the absence of default and q S D (y , b ) in the event of default.
Debt Valuations After Default
In this section, we characterize the valuations of constrained and unconstrained investors during periods in which the government is in default. Let the current income be y, and let b be the amount of debt in default. In this case, the value of one unit of debt for unconstrained high-valuation investors is:
The government regains credit access in the next period with probability θ, in which case R (b) /b is the fraction recovered for each unit of defaulted debt. The value of recovered bonds, q H ND (y, R (b)), is given by (2.6) and reflects the new value of total outstanding . The high-valuation investors buy this debt in the primary market. After that, with probability λ, the low-valuation investors will meet an intermediary. They will sell their bonds at the price q S ND (y t , b t+1 ). After selling their bonds, they exit the market. The lowvaluation investors who do not meet an intermediary will attempt to sell their bonds in the next period. Then, with probability ζ, the high-valuation investors will receive a liquidity shock. They will have the opportunity to sell the bond in the next period in the secondary market. Both the high-and low-valuation investors will receive the debt service m × b t and the coupon z × b t . debt, R (b). Otherwise, investors receive no payments if default is not resolved and the continuation value reflects the probability ζ of receiving a liquidity shock.
Similarly, the per unit value of debt for constrained low-valuation investors is:
(2.9) This valuation is analogous to that of unconstrained investors (2.8), but accounts for holding costs and trading frictions in the secondary market. Constrained investors sell during the next period with probability λ. The selling price for a defaulted bond is:
and reflects the lower investor bargaining power during default: There is no debt issue or debt service. The sovereign has an outstanding balance of debt b t . The lowvaluation investors will meet an intermediary with probability λ. They will sell their bonds at the price q S D (y t , b t ). After they sell the bonds, they exit the market. The low-valuation-investors who do not meet an intermediary will attempt to sell in the next period. Then, with probability ζ, the high-valuation investors will receive a liquidity shock. They will have the opportunity to sell in the next period in the secondary market. Finally, with probability θ, the government resolves the default and re-accesses the credit market in the next period with a total outstanding debt of b t × R(b t ).
Equilibrium
We focus on a Markov equilibrium with state variables y and b. An equilibrium consists of a set of policy functions for consumption C (y, b), default D (y, b), and debt B (y, b), as well as bond valuations
(1) the policies solve the goverment's problem (2.3) taking bond valuations as given, and (2) the bond valuations satisfy equations (2.6) (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9).
Discussion
We now discuss our modeling assumptions. Our goal is to provide a parsimonious framework to study debt and default policy in a setting where default and liquidity risk are jointly determined. We generate bid-ask spreads by introducing search frictions in the secondary market as in Duffie et al. (2005) . Indeed, decentralized bond market trading is an important feature of reality. Having long-term debt is then necessary in order to generate realistic levels of bid-ask spreads. In the extreme case that outstanding debt matures every period bid ask spreads are equal to zero, there is no need to trade as investors can simply wait and receive principal payouts from the government. The combination of long-term debt and secondary market search frictions leads to a difference in valuation between liquidity-constrained and unconstrained investors prior to default, q H ND − q L ND . Both features of our setup are reasonable. First, there is substantial evidence of trading frictions in the secondary market for sovereign bonds (see, e.g., Pelizzon et al. (2013) for recent evidence). Second, long-term debt is now a standard feature of models of sovereign debt following the contributions of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) .
We also introduce a positive debt recovery, R(b) > 0, after a default. Positive recoveries are an important feature of the data (see, e.g., Cruces and Trebesch (2013) ) and, in our model, is necessary in order to generate realistic behavior of bid-ask spreads. This is because the absence of recovery, R(b) = 0, implies no future cash-flows and therefore zero valuations for both constrained and unconstrained investors during default,
In turn, this implies that the (dollar) bid-ask spread is zero during default. More importantly, it would also imply that bid-ask spreads approach zero as default probabilities approach one, which is at odds with a widening of bid-ask spreads during sovereign crises documented in Pelizzon et al. (2013) and the evidence for corporate bonds Edwards et al. (2007) .
We assume a decrease in the bargaining power of investors after a sovereign default, α D < α ND , to capture the positive comovement between (dollar) bid-ask spreads and sovereign default probabilities. Under this assumption, bid-ask spreads are higher during default. As a result, bid-ask spreads will also increase leading up to a default as is consistent with evidence from Pelizzon et al. (2013) . There is substantial evidence of higher bid-ask spreads for defaulted corporate bonds (see, e.g., Edwards et al. (2007) and He and Milbradt (2013) ). We are unaware of similar studies that report bid-ask spreads for a large sample of defaulted sovereign bonds. 10 In Appendix B we discuss our modeling choices using a simple jump-to-default model in which debt policies are fixed and there is an exogenous default probability.
Results
We numerically solve a discretized version of the model. As discussed in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) grid-based methods have poor convergence properties when there is long-term debt. To overcome this problem, we follow their prescription and compute a "slightly perturbed" version of the model described in this section. To ensure numerical accuracy, we choose a dense grid with 200 points for the persistent component of output and 450 points for debt. We implement the model in CUDA and numerically compute the model on a Tesla K80 GPU. Appendix A discusses the details.
Calibration
We calibrate the model developed in section 2 to account for the main features of Argentina's default in 2001. We focus on Argentina over the period from 1993:I to 2001:IV for three reasons. First, using this period facilitates comparison to prior studies in the sovereign debt literature (see, for example, Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano (2008) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) ), and in this way, we can be transparent about the contribution of our paper. Second, this sample satisfies our model's main assumptions: (1) our model is real and Argentina had a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar during this period, and (2) Argentina's bonds were traded in an illiquid secondary market during this period. We calibrate and simulate the model at a monthly frequency because liquidity is inherently a short-run phenomenon. However, we report results at a quarterly frequency to facilitate comparison to previous studies. 11
Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes. As is standard in the literature, we specify the household utility to be CRRA u(c) = c 1−γ 1−γ . We set the endowment process to be:
where z t is a discretized AR(1) process with persistence ρ z , volatility σ z , and normally distributed innovations u t ∼ N(0, 1). We also add a small amount of noise t ∼ trunc N(0, σ 2 ) that is continuously distributed. As shown in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , this is nec-essary to achieve numerical convergence. We set the output loss during default to:
This loss function is proposed by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) As is explained in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , the convexity of output costs is necessary to match the volatility of sovereign spreads.
A priori set parameters. We set risk aversion to γ = 2, which is standard in the sovereign debt literature. The parameters for output are estimated from (linearly) detrended and seasonally adjusted data for Argentina for the quarterly sample from 1980:I to 2001:IV available from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) . After estimating an AR (1) model for output at a quarterly frequency, we obtain monthly values ρ z = 0.983, and σ z = 0.0151, and we fix σ = 0.004. 13 We set the risk free rate to r = 0.0033 per month such that the quarterly risk free rate is 1 percent, which is standard. We set m = 1/60 to match an average debt maturity of 5 years based on values reported in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Broner et al. (2013) . We set the coupon rate to z = 0.01, such that the annualized coupon rate is 12 percent, which is close to the 11 percent value-weighted coupon rate for Argentina reported in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) . We fix the reentry probability at 1 − θ = 0.0128, following Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) . This implies an average exclusion period of 6.5 years. 14 We set the maximum one-month-ahead default probability to δ = 0.75. Finally, we fix λ = 0.8647 such that the average time required for a constrained investor to offload his position to an intermediary is two weeks, as in Chen et al. (Forthcoming) . 12 The case studied in Arellano (2008) features consumption in default that is given by the mean output if the output is over the mean and equal to output if the output is less than the mean. This implies a cost function φ A (y) = max{y − E(y), 0}, which closely resembles the case of d y > 0 and d yy = 0.
13 The conversion is as follows. Total monthly volatility is given by √ 0.004 2 + 0.0151 2 = 0.0156. Then, total monthly volatility and the monthly autocorrelation are converted to a quarterly frequency. This implies an autocorrelation of 0.983 3 = 0.95 and an output volatility of 0.0156 × √ 3 = 0.027. The latter values are those recovered from the data.
14 Beim and Calomiris (2001) (2011)). 17 This value implies that, on average, an unconstrained investor becomes constrained every 7 months.
Calibration Results. The final parameter values and the results from our baseline calibration are reported in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The last column of Table 2 lists the results from Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) for comparison. Our calibrated model closely matches all targeted moments. It generates a mean debt to GDP ratio of 100 percent and an average recovery rate of 29.7 percent. The average sovereign spread is 0.0815 and the volatility is 0.0437. The average bid-ask spread is 50 and 503 basis points before and after default, respectively. Finally, the mean turnover rate is 12 percent.
Coming Next. In the next sections, we use our calibrated model to perform a series of quantitative exercises. In subsection 3.2, we report the pricing functions in the primary market and the bid-ask spreads. In subsections 3.3 and 3.4, we provide a structural decomposition of total spreads into liquidity and default components. In subsection 3.5 we quantify the welfare implications of liquidity frictions. In subsection 3.6 we use our calibrated model to impute the the liquidity component of Argentine spreads in the lead up to Argentina's 2001 default. Finally, subsection 3.7 reports business cycle statistics of the model. . All prices are a function of (y, b ). Panel A plots prices in the primary market for high-valuation investors. Panels B and C plot bid-ask spreads during credit access and during autarky. In all panels, we plot price schedules and bid-ask spreads for two values of y. The values of z are chosen to be ±2 standard deviations of the unconditional distribution for z. The actual values are 0.851 and 1.176. Given our monthly calibration, a 3 on the horizontal axis of debt choice corresponds to an average debt to quarterly output ratio of 1. For panels B and C, a 0.05 in the vertical axis corresponds to 500 basis points. Figure 3 .1 plots the model-implied bond prices and bid-ask spreads as a function of debt choice b . The plots are for high and low values of output y, which correspond to values at plus and minus one standard deviation of the unconditional distribution for output, respectively. Panel A plots bond prices in the primary market q H (y, b ), during the credit access regime. Bond prices are always strictly positive as a consequence of having a positive recovery following default. Standard comparative statics apply: bond prices are increasing in output and decreasing in debt choice, as is usually the case in quantitative models of sovereign debt. Note that since the model is calibrated at a monthly frequency, the debt to quarterly output ratio is approximately b /3. Panel B plots proportional bid-ask spreads, q H − q S / 1 2 q H + q S , during periods in which the government is not in default. The bid-ask spread is approximately 50 basis points for low levels of debt choice (e.g., b ≤ 2.5) regardless of income levels. Bid-ask spreads increase as the likelihood of default increases. This occurs when output is low or debt choice is high. For example, the bid-ask spread reaches 500 basis points when debt choice is b = 3 and output is low, and subsequently continues to increase for larger choices of debt. The logic is as follows. First, recall that bid-ask spreads are larger during periods of default due to a decrease in investor bargaining power when trading defaulted bonds (α D < α ND ). This can be seen in Panel C which plots proportional bid-ask spreads during periods of default as a function of the amount of debt in default. Since prices are forward looking, the increase in bid-ask spreads as the probability of default increases reflects the increased likelihood of encountering the worse liquidity conditions associated with trading defaulted bonds.
Bond Prices, Bid-Ask Spreads, and Feedback
Panel C also illustrates that the proportional bid-ask spread of defaulted bonds is also increasing in the amount of debt in default. The reasoning is as follows. To a first-order approximation the dollar bid-ask spread during default, q H D − q S D , is proportional to holding costs. Since holding costs are constant, the proportional bid-ask spread increases as the value of bonds decrease. The latter is true if the amount of debt in default is high and the fractional recovery per unit of defaulted debt, R (b) /b, is low.
In addition, Panel C also shows that, to a first-order approximation there is no difference in the proportional bid-ask spreads of defaulted bonds across different current output states. From equations (2.8) and (2.9), we see that the value of defaulted bonds depends on the current output state only through its influence on the value of recovered debt upon the government reentering international credit markets. In our calibration, periods of autarky last 6.5 years on average. Over such a horizon, the influence of current output on the eventual recovered debt value is weak. As a result, the proportional bid-ask spread for defaulted bonds depends mainly on the amount of debt in default.
In combination, Panels B and C of 3.1 demonstrate a liquidity-default feedback loop first highlighted by He and Milbradt (2013) in the context of corporate bonds. To see this feedback loop, consider the net proceeds from debt rollover, the difference in the value of newly issued bonds and the repayment of the principal of maturing debt, q H ND,t [b t+1 − (1 − m) b t ] − mb t . A larger debt issuance is necessary to break even when rolling over debt if the probability of default is high and the price of newly issued bonds, q H ND,t , is low. This leads to higher levels of indebtedness and further increases the government's incentives to default in future periods. This rollover risk channel is already understood (see, .e.g, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) ). The presence of liquidity frictions further amplifies this rollover risk channel. Higher debt levels further increase bid-ask spreads in the secondary market (Panel B), which results in an even lower issuance price in the primary bond market. In turn, this further exacerbates the government's default incentives and results in a liquidity-default feedback loop. .2), and the liquidity component is the one defined in (3.3).
Sovereign Spread Decomposition
In this subsection, we present a decomposition of total spreads into a liquidity and a credit component. Our main result is that liquidity premia can be a substantial component of total spreads. As a first step toward a decomposition, we start by defining total spreads, cs (y, Aided by the definition of spreads as a function of policies, given by equation (3.1), we will now introduce a decomposition of total spreads as the sum of a credit and a liquidity component. 18 Denote by B, D the default and debt policies of the baseline calibration (i.e. the parameters listed in Table 1 ). The default component of the sovereign spread is defined as:
Thus, the default component of total spreads, cs DEF (y, b ), is computed with a price that takes into account the default and debt policies of the baseline but the investor pricing these policies faces a zero probability of a liquidity shock. More precisely, the policies (B, D) are the responses of a government that faces prices q H ND (y, b ) | (B,D,ζ) in the primary market. However, the bond price associated with cs DEF (y, b ) is given by q H ND (y, b ) | (B,D,ζ=0) . 19 The liquidity component is then defined as the residual: D,ζ=0) ( 3.3) and accounts for the portion of the total sovereign spread that is not explained by the default component. These two definitions amount to decomposing sovereign spreads as:
Now we delve into the numerical results. What portion of total annualized spreads is explained by each type of risk? The above decomposition is depicted in Figure 3 .2. Panels A and B plot the total spreads, credit risk premium, and liquidity premium for two levels of output; the values of z are chosen to be ±2 standard deviations of the unconditional distribution of z. There are two features of this decomposition that are worth noting. First, Panels A and B show that the liquidity component is increasing as the debt choice increases. This increase reflects a higher default probability combined with higher bid-ask spreads during default. Second, note also that as a percentage of total spreads, the liquidity component is sizable. In particular, when default risk is low (i.e. when output is high and/or debt levels are low) the liquidity component is predominant; however, as the overall default risk increases, the liquidity component as a fraction of total spreads becomes smaller, but remains a first order factor. For example, in Panel B, we observe that the fraction of the total sovereign spreads attributable to liquidity is approximately 45 percent for a debt choice of 1 and a high level of output. However, close to default, for example when output is low and debt choice is around 2, liquidity is responsible for approximately 25 percent of total spreads. These magnitudes are in line with the CDSbasis based calculations in Longstaff et al. (2005) and structural decompositions in He and Milbradt (2013) for Corporate Bonds.
How does liquidity premia depend on default risk? To see this, consider a "jumpto-default" model similar to the model developed in section 2 except that debt is fixed and the default probability is exogenous and given by p d (we present the jump-to-default model in detail in Appendix B). In this case, the valuation of the unconstrained investor (2.6) becomes
is the liquidity premium that is needed to equate the market price q H ND to the valuation of an investor who is not subject to liquidity concerns. Two observations are in order here. First, the value of the liquidity premium is pinned down by the bid-ask spreads. Thus, as long as the calibration generates bid-ask spreads that are in line with the data, the liquidity premia that we obtain are disciplined by the friction we observe empirically. Second, there will be a positive co-movement between liquidity and credit premia as long as bid-ask spreads are larger in default. When this holds, liquidity premia increase during bad times when default risk (p d ) is high.
How does liquidity risk drive default risk? Worsening liquidity conditions exacerbate default incentives by increasing debt rollover costs. To see this, consider a stationary debt structure b t+1 = b t . In this case, the budget constraint (2.1) becomes c t = y t − [m + (1 − m) z] b t + mb t q H ND,t . In the jump-to-default setting, the debt issuance price can also be written as
where
+ r is price discount that compensates investors for expected losses due to secondary market illiquidity. Worse liquidity conditions lead to more substantial price discounts (EL) and lower consumption through increased debt rollover costs. In turn, this generates more significant sovereign default incentives.
Liquidity, Policies, and Spreads
We now more closely examine the two components of spreads: default and liquidity. We would like to quantitatively answer the following two questions. First, what are the determinants of the credit and liquidity components of sovereign spreads? Second, how much of the default premium is explained by liquidity frictions? How much of the liquidity premium is explained by default risk?
A Closer Examination of the Default Risk Premium. We begin by analyzing the default component. To do so, we further decompose cs DEF into two components:
Denote by B 0 , D 0 the debt and default policies for the baseline calibration when the probability of receiving a liquidity shock, ζ, is equal to zero. 20 These two terms are defined 20 More precisely, we solve for the optimal policies when the parameters are those in Table 3 .1, with ζ = 0 instead of the baseline of ζ = 0.139. as:
The first term, equation (3.6), is the pure default component. This is the spread that the sovereign would pay if there were no liquidity frictions. That is, the investors do not receive liquidity shocks, and the policies are those in the baseline calibration with no liquidity shocks. The second term, equation (3.7), is the liquidity-induced component of default spreads. This is the spread in addition to the pure default component that is caused by a change in policies due to liquidity frictions. However, the change in spreads comes only through a change in policies. Thus, we fix the probability of a liquidity shock at zero, i.e. ζ = 0. Depending on the response of debt and default policies when liquidity shocks are switched on, from (B 0 , D 0 ) to (B, D), the component cs LIQ→DEF (y, b ) might be positive or negative. For example, holding default policies fixed, if the government takes on less debt due to liquidity frictions, cs LIQ→DEF (y, b ) will be negative. Alternatively, fixing debt policies, if due to liquidity frictions the government defaults in more states of nature, then cs LIQ→DEF (y, b ) will be positive. 21 To quantify the response of debt and default policies, it will be useful to to further decompose cs LIQ→DEF (y, b ), into two terms:
These two terms are defined as:
The first term, equation (3.8), is the change in spreads due to changes in default policies, while holding default policy fixed. This term measures the response of spreads to changes in the frictions in the secondary market that operate through debt policy. The second term, equation (3.9), is the change in spreads due to changes in default policies, holding debt policy fixed, and measures the response in spreads due to default policy. Do liquidity frictions increase or decrease default risk? The overall response and the one of each of the components cs DEF,DEF , cs LIQ→DEF , cs LIQ→DEF,Debt , cs LIQ→DEF,De f are depicted in Figure 3 .3 Panel B. Note that as we mentioned, in our calibration the component cs LIQ→DEF,Debt is negative. This is because worse liquidity conditions, given default policies, will imply a more precautionary debt policy. Furthermore, note that the component cs LIQ→DEF,De f is always positive.
A Closer Examination of the Liquidity Risk Premium. We can further decompose the liquidity premium into two terms:
(3.10)
These two terms are defined as follows:
The first component, equation (3.11), measures the spread when investors can receive liquidity shocks but the government never defaults on debt. The second term, equation (3.12), measures how much in addition to the spread due solely to liquidity shocks the government needs to pay to compensate for default risk. This term is a residual that measures the portion of the liquidity component that is not explained by the pure liquidity component, and thus, by default risk. Panel C of Figure 3 .3 illustrates these two components. As one would imagine, the pure liquidity component does not vary with debt levels because this component is not sensitive to the default probabilities, which are affected by the output realizations. Note, however, that the default-induced liquidity component is increasing as debt increases, and a default is more likely. This increase in the liquidity premia, as a consequence of higher default risk, simply illustrates what was clear from the jump-to-default model: that default probabilities drive the variations in the liquidity premia.
Relationship to the Literature. The previous two decompositions highlight one of the key differences of the sovereign setting with respect to the decompositions for the corporate setting in He and Milbradt (2013) and Chen et al. (Forthcoming) . Note that from (3.5) and (3.10), we can define total spreads as:
(3.13) This is precisely the decomposition of sovereign spreads studied in He and Milbradt (2013) and Chen et al. (Forthcoming) . The main difference is that these papers feature a fixed debt policy and the outside option of default does not depend on future policies. 22 Thus, in that setup, one can show that all four terms in (3.13) are positive. The reason is that the response of spreads to liquidity frictions that comes through a change in debt policies, cs LIQ→DEF,Debt , is equal to zero. In addition, in both of these papers, the response to liquidity spreads that comes through default, cs LIQ→DEF,De f , is an increase in spreads, because the corporation defaults in more states of nature, unambiguously, in response to higher liquidity shocks.
Secondary Market Frictions and Welfare
In this section, we examine the implications of secondary market illiquidity for household welfare. We define welfare as the certainty equivalent consumption:
obtained by a sovereign with no initial debt (b = 0) operating in an economy in which constrained international investors are subject to holding costs h c . We vary the illiquidity of secondary bond markets, as measured by bid-ask spreads, by varying the severity of liquidity shocks for international investors and consider the resulting welfare impli- 22 In a corporate setting these assumption are standard. First, the default for equity-holders corresponds to bankruptcy, the value of which is usually exogenously fixed at zero (they optimally liquidate the firm when it has no value for them). Second, the rationale for a fixed debt policy is that the bond issue might have a covenant that restricts further issues, and this covenant is enforceable in court. This assumption of a constant debt structure is thus, usually, for simplicity. cations for the sovereign. In particular, we vary international investors' holding costs conditional on receiving a liquidity shock, h c , starting with an economy in which international investors never become constrained (i.e. h c = 0), and we then slowly worsen the severity of liquidity shocks by increasing holding costs, h c . The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 3 . We see that the average bid-ask spread is increasing in holding costs. Importantly, household welfare decreases as the secondary bond market becomes more illiquid. In particular, decreasing bid-ask spreads from 50 basis points to zero results in a 0.17 percent increase in household welfare. To put this number in perspective, the welfare gain from eliminating the business cycle in a representative agent setting with CRRA preferences is 0.40 percent of consumption equivalent. Thus, the welfare gains from removing secondary market frictions are substantial. In particular, through the lens of our model, in that period, secondary market frictions can account for 42.5 percent of the cost of the business cycle for Argentina. 23
Case Study: Argentina's Default in 2001
In this subsection, we conduct an event study of Argentina's default in December of 2001. For the policy functions of the baseline calibration, depicted in Table 1 , we we input the output shocks that Argentina received in the 1990s and the initial level of debt. Panel A plots the level of GDP in logs. Panel B plots the total spreads generated by our model in 23 Appendix C details the calculations of the welfare cost of the business cycles for Argentina following Lucas (2003) . Note also that the welfare cost of business cycles is substantially higher once deviations from the the CRRA framework in Lucas (2003) are introduced. See, for example Krusell et al. (2009 ), Barlevy (2004 and Alvarez and Jermann (2004) . In that case, the welfare losses from, in relative terms, liquidity frictions will be smaller. Table 4 : Business cycle properties.
comparison with the data. Finally, Panel C plots total spreads and the liquidity and credit components computed using the decomposition in (3.5). First, note that our model can replicate the most salient features of the series of spreads. The first spike is the Tequila crisis in Mexico in 1996, where there is a sharp increase in the spreads coming from a recession. In addition, we can see that for 2001 the model can correctly account for the spike in spreads and default. Note that although the recession started in 1998:III, spreads continued to be below 800 basis points until the beginning of 2001.
Second, in Panel C, we observe that that the liquidity premium is a larger portion of total spreads during good times, when total spreads are low. However, when the spreads began to spike in 1999, the liquidity component started to be a smaller portion of total spreads. In fact, in our calibration, it can explain 20 percent of the total spreads during the period of the crisis.
Business Cycle Properties
The model's business cycle properties are summarized in Table 4 . The second column lists the empirical moments in the data, while the last column lists the results from Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) for comparison. Our calibrated model performs well. As in the data, consumption is as volatile as output, and nearly perfectly correlated with it. The volatility of the current account relative to output volatility is 0.09 in the model, which is close to its empirical counterpart of 0.17. The model performs well at capturing countercyclical sovereign credit risk, with a correlation of -0.65 between the sovereign spread and output. In addition, there is a negative correlation, -0.50, between the current account and output. Finally, debt service (as a fraction of output) is 7.9 percent and the default frequency is 6.6 percent. Overall, the business cycle properties generated by the calibrated model are similar to those generated by the model in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) .
Conclusion
The quantitative literature of sovereign-debt has helped us to understand debt capacity, spreads, and welfare when the central friction is lack of commitment to repayment. The recent Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe, however, has highlighted that there is substantial liquidity risk associated with sovereign lending. Motivated by these facts, in this paper we studied debt and default policy when the government lacks commitment, and there is search friction in the secondary market for sovereign bonds.
After proposing a tractable framework in which credit and liquidity risk constrain the choices of the government we proceeded to study the quantitative importance of liquidity in sovereign spreads and welfare. To do so, we calibrated our model to match the main features of the Argentinean default in the 1990s, one of the most widely studied cases for sovereign default. Our first result is that liquidity risk is a substantial component of sovereign spreads. In particular, in a model based decomposition, we found that around 30 percent of total sovereign spreads. Our second result is that liquidity also matters for welfare. In particular, through the lens of our model, a representative agent would be willing to pay around 42 percent of what she would be willing to pay to shut down business cycles to shut down liquidity frictions.
Why should we distinguish between credit and liquidity risk? Why should we incorporate liquidity risk in models of sovereign borrowing? An important reason to distinguish between credit and liquidity risk are the different normative implications of each friction. As we mentioned before, there are at least three reasons why the introduction of liquidity would matter for debt management policy. First, policies in the long run to fight spreads caused by lack of commitment might be different to those to combat spreads due to the lack of liquidity. Second, policies in the short run might also be different; for example, one strategy during bad times could be to capitalize financial intermediaries as opposed to decreasing government spending or repaying debt. Third, maturity and currency management policies might also differ. The benefit of spreading debt across currencies and maturities is to complete the market. However, the unintended consequence would be lower liquidity in the market for these bonds, which could undo any benefits due to higher costs. All of these are topics for further research.
to take into account the randomization component. Finally, bond prices are also adjusted to take into account the additional randomization variable:
The rest of the numerical scheme is standard and follows the routine outlined in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). We summarize the scheme in 4 steps: a. Start by discretizing the state space. This involves choosing grids {y i } c. Given the debt and default policies, bond prices are then updated.
d. The above steps are iterated until both value functions and bond prices converge.
B Jump to Default
In this appendix, we describe a particular case of our model in which default probabilities are exogenous, and debt is fixed. The idea is to introduce a clear definition of the liquidity premium, show how bid-ask spreads map onto the liquidity premium as a function of default risk, and to clarify the role of the features of the model in the results. Assume an unconditional constant default probability p LR in each period. Then the pricing equations yield a system of 6 equations and
The system is given by: 24
where R ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction recovered after a default. The solution to this system yields four value functions that depend on the unconditional default probability, p LR , and the parameters of the model. Fix the unconditional default probability, p LR , and suppose there is a short-run departure. In particular, the current default probability is p d . After a default, the default probability will remain fixed at the long run probability of default, p LR . 25 Then, current prices are given by:
Note that difference between the first system of four equations and the second system is that in the first oneq H ND (p LR ),q L ND (p LR ) are taken as given. This will permit us to take limits on p d over [0, 1] and still have a well-defined system of equations. For both systems of equations, that define valuations (B.1) and (B.2), free disposal of the asset implies that all the valuations are non-negative.
Bid-Ask Spreads and Liquidity Premia.
How do the observable frictions in the secondary market, the bid-ask spreads, map onto liquidity premia? To see the connection, rewrite the bond price (B.2) as: where the endogenous liquidity component is:
That is, ND is the additional liquidity spread that is needed to equate the market price q H ND to the valuation of an investor who is not subject to liquidity concerns. Two obser- vations about this liquidity component are in order. First, it is the expected valuation loss after taking into account the loss conditional on having to sell and the probability of incurring a liquidity event and having to sell. Second, it depends on distance to default (or p d ); this is the case because the loss conditional on selling is higher during a default episode. Figure B .1 illustrates the relationship between proportional bid-ask spreads in and out of default, default probabilities, and the liquidity premium (B.3). 26
Liquidity and Default. In our baseline model with endogenous default, worsening liquidity conditions exacerbate default incentives by increasing debt rollover costs. To see this, consider the stationary setting in which debt is fixed b t = b. In this case, the budget constraint (2.1) becomes
From this, we see that worsening liquidity conditions will increase default incentives if it leads to lower debt issuance prices q H ND . The link between liquidity conditions and issuance prices can be illustrated using our simple jump-to-default model by rewriting 26 The numerical examples in this section use the following parameters: z = 0.03, θ = 0.0128, r = 0.0033, ζ = 0.139, α ND = 0.125, α D = 0, R = 0.3, andp LR = 0.03. is the compensation for expected losses due to secondary market illiquidity. A liquidity-default spiral will be present whenever increases in the likelihood of default (p d ) increase expected liquidity losses (EL). For this to happen, each of the model's ingredients are needed: long-term debt and frictions on the secondary market; positive recovery (R(b) > 0); and, worse liquidity conditions during a default (α D < α ND ). First, Long-term debt and frictions in the secondary market are needed to generate a bid-ask spread. That is, the following conditions need to hold: λ ∈ (0, 1) and m < 1. Second, recovery is needed for the bonds to have a positive price during default. If this were not to be the case, bid-ask spreads would not defined during the default state. Third, worser liquidity conditions during default are needed to generate higher bid-ask spreads during default. Figure B .2 illustrates the role of the model's ingredients by plotting the relationship between liquidity premia and default probabilities for three different scenarios. The solid lines plot the case in which there is long-term debt and frictions in the secondary market, but no recovery ( f = 0). In this case, we see in Panels A and B that both dollar bid-ask spreads and expected losses decrease as default probabilities increase. Next, the dash-dot lines illustrate the case for which there is a positive recovery value for bonds ( f > 0), but bondholders' bargaining does not decrease in default (α D = α ND ). In this case, both dollar bid-ask spreads and expected losses remain constant as default probabilities increase. Finally, the dotted lines show the case for which both positive recovery and a post-default decrease in bondholders' bargaining power (i.e. α D < α ND ) are present. Here, we see that liquidity premia increas as default becomes more likely. This implies the presence of the default-liquidity feedback channel: in the baseline model with endogenous default rates, increased liquidity premia increase the cost of rolling over debt which, in turn, further increases default incentives.
C Welfare Cost of Business Cycles
In order to put the welfare cost of liquidity frictions in perspective, we compute how much a representative agent in Argentina would pay in order to avoid fluctuations in consumption. The exercise follows Lucas (2003) . In this Appendix we detail our calculations. As in the main body of the paper, the de-trended output process is given by: y t = e z t + t z t = ρ z z t−1 + σ z u t .
We assume that the de-trended consumption process is AR(1) and that, in particular, follows: Note that the expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution of consumption, where consumption is defined in (C.1), and that this distribution is derived from the distribution of output. The unconditional value function is then given by:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of consumption. What is the welfare of a constant stream of consumption c E ? This is the measure of welfare in terms of consumption equivalent. It is given by:
This implies that the certainty equivalent of stream of consumption with valueṼ is given by:
For the CRRA case, this is given by:
How much consumption is the agent willing to resign in order to avoid shocks? In the absence of shocks, u t = 0 for all t, then c = 1. Therefore, the cost of business cycle: 1 − c E . The implementation of the calculation is as follows. First, V(c) is computed numerically using our calibrated income process for Argentina (the smoothing component is ignored). Second, given V(c) we obtain V = E c [V (c )] using the Ergodic distribution of consumption implied by the process c t = y λ t . Third, we obtain the consumption equivalent and therefore cost of the business cycle as 1 − c E . This value is 0.0040, or 0.4 percent in terms of consumption equivalent.
